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Competition of Multinationals from Different Cultural Backgrounds: 








This paper considers competition between two multinationals (U, J) who compete in a third market (K).  
The multinationals have similar cost structures, but differ in that J comes from a country that is “culturally 
similar” to K, and hence produces products that match more closely the preferences of K residents.  This 
similarity gives J an advantage in K’s market and, if only one firm may enter, J can earn higher profits.  
However, we show: (i)K may benefit more from the entry of the dissimilar firm (U), and (ii)in a strategic 
competition between the two firms, the cultural similarity may be a strategic disadvantage.   
 
                                                           
† The authors are, respectively, graduate student and Professor, Department of Economics, Iowa State University.  
Lapan is the corresponding author; his email address is hlapan@iastate.edu. Competition of Multinationals under Different Cultural Backgrounds: 
Does Familiarity Breed Contempt? 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
It is sometimes argued (Caves, 1996; UNCTAD World Investment Report, 1998) that multinationals from 
one country (e.g., the US) have an intrinsic advantage over multinationals from another country (e.g., 
Japan) in foreign countries that are culturally similar to their own country.  For example, US 
multinationals may be seen to have a cultural (not simply geographic) advantage over Japanese 
multinationals in Canada, Europe and Australia, whereas Japanese multinationals are perceived to have 
advantages in other Asian countries, such as Korea, Thailand, and so forth. Table 1 shows the number of 
affiliates, sales per capita of all affiliates, and net income of U.S multinationals in several countries that 
have sizable populations and high income.  The table roughly suggests that the performance of US 
multinationals in European countries, Canada, and Australia dominates their performance in Asian 
countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.   
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
  
Several empirical studies imply that the cultural or political similarity of the host country may affect 
foreign direct investment.  For example, Nankani (1979) showed that foreign investment is larger in the 
host countries that had had a colonial tie with the home country.  Another example is that multinationals 
often start in neighboring countries that may be close to the host country in culture as well as in physical 
distance; U.S. multinationals may start in Canada and then proceed to the United Kingdom (Davidson, 
1980), Japanese firms start in the Southeast Asia (Yoshihara, 1978; Tsurumi, 1976), Australian 
 1multinationals in New Zealand (Deane, 1970), and Italian firms in neighboring southern European 
countries (Onida and Viesti, 1988).  
 
Another neglected fact about multinational behavior concerns the type of products the multinational 
supplies and the strategic choice in R&D made to develop that product. Previous research on 
multinationals usually has assumed that multinational firms produce homogenous products in many 
countries. However, we can observe that many multinational firms and exporters develop and produce 
localized products to serve specific market areas. For example, all Japanese carmakers supply cars that 
have the driver seat on the left side to US consumers, although they sell cars with the driver seat on the 
right side in Japan. Microsoft also supplies different language versions of its software in different 
countries. A survey of foreign-based multinationals in the manufacturing sector in South Korea conducted 
by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) and the Korea Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry, and Energy shows that 67% of the foreign-based firms in Korea produce the standardized and 
locally adjustable product , 25% of MNEs produce a product that is fully localized to fit the Korean 
market, and 8% of MNEs produce the standard product (Kang, Park, Lee, and Byun, 2002).  Another 
survey of Korea-based multinational firms in the manufacturing industry shows that 56% of the Korea-
based firms produce the standardized and locally adjustable product in the host country, 21% of them 
produce fully localized products, and 23% of them produce the standard product (Kang, Park, Lee, and 
Byun, 2003). Most recent surveys on Korea-based multinationals in the manufacturing sector show similar 
results (Kang, Lee, Lee, and Ahn, 2004). 
 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
For the purposes of clarity, let us assume we are discussing two multinationals, one (labeled U) from the 
US and one (labeled J) from Japan, and that these firms are considering entering a third market, labeled K.  
Assuming K, the host country, is culturally similar to Japan, there are several reasons why the Japanese 
 2firm may be thought to have an advantage in the host country.  One reason is that the firm (or its 
managers) are likely to be more familiar with the way in which business is done in the host country, and 
thus the multinational J should have lower fixed costs associated with entering that market.  Similarly, 
because countries that are “culturally similar” may be assumed to have similar tastes, it is argued that 
products the multinational J produces will be more acceptable to consumers in country K than would 
products produced by the multinational U.   This advantage could manifest itself in one of two ways:  
because the particular characteristics of a given product (“variety”) produced for the U market are likely to 
differ from those produced for the J market, and because the variety for the J market is more similar to that 
which K consumers demand, then either: (i)it will be cheaper to modify the J good for sale in the K 
market, or – equivalently – the willingness of K consumers to pay for the J good will be higher than their 
willingness to pay for the U good.  In either case, the multinational J will have a cost (or revenue) 
advantage over the multinational U, and thus is likely to be able to earn higher profits in the K market.   
 
We will show below that this argument is correct when considering the profitability for either 
multinational entering the host market K alone – that is, under the given arguments, it will always be more 
profitable for the multinational J to enter than for the multinational U to enter.  Hence, there will be a 
range of fixed costs for which, if only one could enter, J would find it profitable to do so whereas U would 
not.  Nevertheless, we shall also show that, in a strategic equilibrium in which both may enter, the cultural 
similarity for J in market K may turn out to be a strategic disadvantage. 
 
2.  Model. 
 
We assume two multinationals, U and J.  Each produces a similar product for their home market, but 
because of local taste variations the particular characteristics of the two products differ.  Each 
multinational is considering entering a third country, called the host country K.  We index product variety 
by θ , and call the variety produced by each multinational 
U θ  and 
J θ  respectively.  For now, these 
 3varieties are taken as given, though later we consider the whole game in which each multinational chooses 
that variety.  Without loss of generality, we assume 
UJ θ θ < .   
 
Turning to preferences in the host country, we let 
K θ  be the ideal variety for the host country, and define 
,
JJ K d θ θ =−  
UU K d θ θ =−.  Thus, we define cultural similarity, in this context, to imply 
J U dd < .  
Turning now to demand, we assume that the inverse demand for a good of variety 
i θ  is given by: 
 
(1)  () ( )        if 










where ( ) , a λ  are positive parameters, 
K θ  is the ideal variety demand by the host country, 
i θ  is the actual 
variety of this good,   represents total sales of all goods (including other varieties), and  q
K N  represents 
market size in the host country.  If 
iK θ θ ≠ , there is no demand for variety 
i θ . The consumers in the 
country i purchase only their preferred variety.
1
 
For the technology, we will develop a framework that is similar with the framework developed by Eaton 
and Schmitt (1994) to discuss the flexibility of the technology.
2  The multinational, if it decides to sell in 
                                                           
1 In the text we assume consumers buy only their preferred variety and the firms supply this variety with several 
production strategies discussed later.  This assumption can be relaxed by assuming that consumers’ willingness to 
pay depends upon the distance between their preferred variety and the variety supplied by the multinational.   
2 They developed the flexible technology that the firm can produce any final products from base products with 
adjustment cost to study firms’ entry, preemption and merger in a market with evenly distributed consumer 
preferences.  Norman and Thisse (1999) used this Eaton-Schmitt model to analyze the entry and preemption under 
the allowing ‘designated (or specialized) technology’.  Norman (2002) also adopted the Eaton-Schmitt model to 
 4the host country, has to incur a fixed entry cost  i E , which incorporates the legal and political costs for 
establishing a business.  Since the familiarity with the local institutions will affect these costs, the value of 




1. The adjustment technology is the process that allows one variety to be transformed into a different 
variety with additional marginal production costs which depend on the similarity between the varieties. 
2. The platform variety is the prototype of the variety before the adjustment technology is applied. 
 
The additional marginal cost due to the adjustment technology can be thought of as the marginal costs that 
are required to change the characteristics of the product (e.g., from left-hand drive to right-hand drive) 
from the current platform without developing a new platform. 
 
Therefore, if the multinational enters, it has to produce the unique variety 
K θ  that the local market 
demands.  The multinational can produce 
K θ  in one of two ways; it can produce 
K θ  by adjusting the 
variety it currently produces for its home market, or it can develop a new platform 
K θ  at a fixed R&D 
cost 
4
i V .  Again, it is possible that these development costs may vary across multinationals.  If the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
discuss the firms’ choice of level of the flexible technology and the location of the base products in many 
submarkets. 
3 The adjustment technology is technically the same as the flexible technology that was developed by Eaton and 
Schimitt (1994). The platform variety is equivalent to the base variety in their model.  
4 This strategy is essentially the same as the ‘designated technology’ in Norman and Thisse (1999) and Norman 
(2002). Also, it is similar to the ‘dedicated ‘ production strategy in Chang (1993, 1998) or the ‘inflexible’ technology 
(e.g. Boyer and Moreaux, 1997).  Notice that the multinational can achieve mass production with this production 
strategy since it has lower marginal cost than the alternative. 
 5multinational supplies the variety used in the home market, the firm adjusts the home-preferred variety to 
serve the local market with the additional adjustment marginal cost 
iK b θ θ −  where b is a positive 
parameter.  This additional adjustment marginal cost is proportional to the difference between the home-




K θ θθ ≡+ −  where 
i θ  is the platform variety that the firm h chooses and   is the marginal 
cost for firm h on the platform variety.  Thus, each multinational incurs the following total costs if it enters 
the host country: 
h c
Entry with current platform:      ( ) ;,
hh K
hh h TC c b q E h J U θθ =+ − + =  
Entry with (new) host country platform:   ( ) ;,
h
hh h h TC c q E V h J U =+ +=  
 
In order to focus on the advantages of cultural similarity, we assume throughout the paper that the two 
multinationals have the same basic marginal cost function: 
Assumption 1:   ;, ; ;
JU h h K
UJ J U J ccc dd d EE VV θθ == < ≡ − ≤ ≤ U  
 
3.  Monopoly 
 
Let 
h θ    denote the variety the firm produces for its home market (which, for now, is given).  
The multinational has a choice of entering with that platform 
( , hJ U = )
( )
ih θ θ = , or of creating a new platform 
solely for the local market.  In the latter case, it is obvious it will choose the platform 
iK θ θ =  and will 
incur a fixed cost  .  In the former case, there is no fixed R&D cost   but it will incur the additional  i V i V
 6marginal cost 
hK b θ θ − .  Thus, assuming constant marginal production costs for the multinational h of 
, the profits multinational h will earn if it enters using the same platform as in its home market are c
5: 
 
(2)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ;
hh h K h h h
hh hh p c bd q E a N q c bd q E d
K π θλ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =− + − = − − + − ≡ − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ θ θ  
 
whereas if it enters with a variety tailored to the local market profits are: 
 
(3)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ;
hK K i
hh h hh h pc q E V a N q c q E V





For simplicity, we first solve for the optimal decision for an entering multinational under the assumption it 
is the only entrant.  Optimizing (2) and (3), and substituting back into the profit function yields: 
 
(4) if 








q acb d acb d E θπ θ
λλ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=− − =− − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
h −   
 
(5) if 







qa c a c θπ θ
λλ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=− =− − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
E V −




5 An alternative, but mathematically equivalent, approach is to assume consumer willingness to pay depends on the 
distance between their ideal variety and the variety supplied by the firm.  Assume inverse demand is given by:   
() ˆ (/ )
ii KK p ab q N θθ θ λ =− − − .   The firm’s profit function it if sells its home variety in the host market is: 
() ( )
hi h h p cq E πθ =− − , which is indistinguishable from that given in (2).  This demand structure is also used in 
Eaton and Schmitt (1994), with the exception that they assume the consumer buys at most one unit. 
 7where (4) represents the firm’s optimal decision, and profits, if it uses its current variety, and (5) are 
optimal decisions and profits if the multinational creates a new variety to meet the local tastes.   
 
Given the cost and similarity assumptions, the following results are self-evident for the monopoly case: 
 
Proposition 1:  Suppose multinational J is more familiar with the host country K then is the multinational 
U, where more familiar means:   ,
J U
JU E Ed d ≤< .  Then:   
 
1.  Given  J U cc = , the more familiar multinational can earn higher monopoly profits in the host country 
and hence the larger the range of fixed costs it can afford to pay to enter the market.   
2.  Assuming the same base production costs ( ) JU cc =  and that the fixed R&D costs of creating a new 
variety are the same () J U VV = , the less familiar multinational, U, is more likely to develop and sell a 
variety tailored to the local market. 
 
Proof: By assumption, variable costs are lower for firm J if each firm uses their home variety, whereas 
variable costs are the same if both firms develop a new platform.  Thus,  ( ) ( ) ˆˆ
J JU U π θπ θ > , whereas, 
given    ,
UJ VV = ( ) ( ) ˆˆ
JK UK π θπ θ ≤  as  J U E E ≤ .  Thus, since  ( ) ( ) { } ˆˆ ,
hh h h Max ππ θ π θ = 
K  it follows 
immediately that 
J U π π >   given  ,
J U
JU E Ed d << .  As far as creating a product tailored to the local 
market, the multinational will choose to do so if: 
( ) ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( )( ) [] ( )
2 2 ˆˆ 44 2
hK hh K h K h h
h N ac acb d N b d ac b d V πθ πθ λ λ ⎡⎤ >→ − − − −= − − > ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 
Since the LHS of the expression is an increasing function of   it is clear that the range of product 
development costs  for which it is optimal for the familiar multinational to develop a product for the 





Note that if either firm enters with the product used in their home market, then it is better from the 
perspective of the host country that the “familiar” multinational enter since lower marginal costs implies 
lower market price.  However, since the dissimilar multinational is more likely to develop a local product, 
it may be that locals are better off if the entrant is the dissimilar multinational.   
 
Corollary 1.1:  Suppose   and:  JU ccc ==
( ) () ( ) ( ) () ( )
2 2 2 2 44
KU K




Then the host country will be better off if the dissimilar multinational enters. 
 
Thus, under these conditions, if the local market can only support one firm, auctioning off the right to 
enter the local market to the highest bidder is not optimal from the perspective of the host country.   
From now on, we assume the host country market size is large enough (or quasi-fixed costs small enough) 
so that either multinational would find it profitable to enter the host country as a monopolist: 
 
Assumption 2:   ( ) ( ) { } ˆˆ ,0 ,
hh hK , Max h J U πθ πθ >=  
 
From the structure of profits, we can make the following claim:  
 
Proposition 2:  The smaller are base production costs, or the larger is the host market, the larger the range 
of fixed R&D costs for which the multinational will find it optimal to develop a local platform. 
 
Proof: From equations (4) and (5):    ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ] ( ) ˆˆ 42
hK hh K h h
h Nb d a c b d πθ πθ λ ⎡⎤ V − =− − ⎣⎦ −  
 9Clearly, this expression is a monotonically increasing function of 
K N  and decreasing function of c and 
hence  the  proposition  follows.         QED 
 
Discussion:  This implies that, since for relatively small markets neither firm will find it profitable to 
develop a new platform, the culturally similar multinational will have a greater advantage; moreover, the 
host country will benefit more from the entry of the culturally similar multinational.  For somewhat larger 
countries, only the dissimilar multinational has the incentive to develop a new platform and hence, for 
those countries, while the similar multinational can enter more profitably, the host country’s benefits are 
larger when the dissimilar multinational enters.  Finally, for the largest countries, both firms would – if 
entering as a monopolist - develop a new platform and the only advantage, if any, for the similar 
multinational is in terms of lower fixed entry costs. 
 
The conditions for the monopoly case discussed above are summarized in Table 4. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.  Strategic Interaction 
 
In this section we consider the strategic game that would be played between two multinationals who 
compete (or are contemplating competing) in the same host country.  As in the previous section, the 
inverse demand is assumed to be: 
 
pa q φ =−  
 
where  ( )
K N φλ ≡   and 
J U qq q =+.   is the quantity of variety 
i q
K θ  supplied by the multinational i. 
 10 
We start by assuming that each multinational, as in the previous section, has its own predetermined 
platform for a particular good; this assumption will be relaxed later.  Given this platform, the game is 
played in the following sequence: 
 
1.  The two firms move simultaneously; each multinational decides whether to enter the K market at a 
cost of   ( h E ) , hJ U =  and, if it enters, whether to keeps its original platform, 
h θ , or to develop - 
at a cost of   - a new platform,  h V
K θ , tailored to the K market.
6  
2.  Given the prior stage decision, each entering firm simultaneously chooses its output. If only one 
firm entered, then the equilibrium is as described in the previous section. 
 
We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.  We make the following parametric 
assumptions; we assume that development costs, and initial varieties, are such that, under a monopoly 
solution, the culturally familiar multinational J, will earn higher profits by using its original variety, 
whereas the dissimilar multinational, U, will develop a unique variety for the host market.  We also 
assume both firms can make positive monopoly profits.  These imply: 
 
Assumption 3:  The following parametric assumptions are made 
() ()
2 2 ,, 11
0
44
JJ M J J M
JJ K ac b d E ac V E ππ π
φφ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ≡= − − −> = − − − > ⎡⎤ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 J J  
() ()
2 2 ,, 1
;0
4
UU M U M U U M
KU U U U a c V E a c bd E and ππ π π
φ




                                                          
 
 
6Similar results as those that follow could be derived if these decisions were split into two separate stages - first, the 
entry decision, and then - if entry occurs - the platform decision.  It is presented this way simply because it simplifies 
representation of the normal form game 
 11which implies:  () () 22
44
UU U J J bb
da c b d V V da c b d
φφ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ −− > ≥ > −− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠




UU E ac V
φ
⎧⎫ ⎛⎞





h π   represents the maximum monopoly profits firm h can earn.  The subscript on the profit function 
refers to the choice of the platform and M in the superscripts refers to the monopoly solution.  Under the 
parametric assumptions made, the familiar firm can always make higher monopoly profits: 
J U π π >  . 
 
Now consider the oligopoly game.  Notationally, let  ,
h
xy π  represent the profits - exclusive of entry costs - 
that firm h earns if both firms enter, with firm J using platform x, and firm U using platform y 
( ,; ,) x JKy UK == .   The profit matrix for the duopoly game is: 
 
Firm J/firm U  Don’t enter  Enter with 
U θ  Enter  with 
K θ  
Don’t enter  0,0  0, ( )
, UM
UU E π −  0,  ( )
, UM
KU E π −  
Enter with 
J θ   ()
, JM
J J E π − , 0 ( ) ( ) ,, ;
JU
J UJ J UU E E ππ −−   ( )( ) ,, ;
JU
JK J JK U E E ππ −−  
Enter with 
K θ   ()
, JM
K J E π − , 0 ( ) ( ) ,, ;
JU
KU J KU U E E ππ −− ( )( ) ,, ;
JU
K KJ K KU E E ππ −−
  
 12We start by analyzing the duopoly game, given that both firms enter.   To do so, let   be adjusted cost for 
firm h,  . If the firm adopts the local variety, 
h c 
, hJ K = h cc =  ; otherwise,  .  In the duopoly 
equilibrium, a firm’s output and variable profits are expressed as
h





,, ; , ,
3
h mh ac c






 m h   and 
  ()
2 2
,, ; , ,
9
mh h ac c










 is operating profits, exclusive of development costs.  Hence: 
 







iff V V a c b d d ππ
φ
⎛⎞
>< ≡ − − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
−  







iff V V a c b d ππ
φ
⎛⎞
>< ≡ − − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠




















iff V V a c b d d ππ
φ
⎛⎞
>< ≡ − − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
−  







iff V V a c b d ππ
φ
⎛⎞
>< ≡ − − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠














Given the cost structure,   - that is, the value to either firm of adopting the local 
platform is lower when the other firm has adopted that platform.   Also note that, given 
12 3  and  VV VV > 4 >
J U dd < ,  31 VV <  
                                                           
7 We assume demand is sufficiently large to guarantee that outputs will be positive if both firms enter, i.e.:  
  () 20
U ac b d −− >
 13and  , which implies that - given the action of the other firm - the value of adopting the local 
platform is higher for the more dissimilar firm. However, the ordering of   cannot be determined 
under the given parametric assumptions. 
4 VV < 2
3 V 2 and  V
     
When  , the dominant strategy for firm U is - given entry - to adopt the new platform  2 U VV <
K θ ; when 
, the dominant strategy - given entry - is for firm U to use its current platform  1 U VV >
U θ  and adjust it to 
local tastes.  Otherwise, for  , firm U chooses either platform  21 (,) U VV V ∈
U θ  or 
K θ  depending on the 
platform choice of firm J.  If  [ ] 21 , U VV V ∈ , firm U responds to firm J by using its current platform 
U θ  if 
firm J uses the localized platform 
K θ ; while if firm J supplies 
J θ  to the host country using the 
adjustment technology, firm U responds by developing the localized platform 
K θ .  The strategic choice of 
firm J is similar.  Figure 1 shows the pattern of the equilibrium, assuming entry occurs.
8   
 
  J U VV =
:( , )
K K A θ θ
:( , )
J K C θ θ
:( , )
J K F θ θ :( , )
J K G θ θ
:( , )






K U B θ θ :( , )
K U E θ θ
:( , )
K U H θ θ
:( , )














Figure 1. Equilibrium states and R&D cost 
                                                           
8 As would occur if entry costs were zero. 
 14 
The profit structures of the firms in each equilibrium are shown in Table 5. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Using the cost assumptions and the symmetry of the profit functions, the following relations hold for 
profits:   
,,
JU
J KK U π π >  and  ,
JU
, J UJ U π π >  for 
UJ dd > ,   .  UJ VV ≥
,,
JU
K KK ππ ≥ K ,  and  ,
JU
K UJ K π π >  for 
UJ dd > ,   .   UJ VV ≥
The equality in () ,
K K θ θ  holds if R&D costs are the same for the two firms ( ) UJ VV = .  Therefore, when 
both firms enter the host country either with the new localized platform or with the current platform 
utilizing the adjustment process, that is, in a symmetric equilibrium (, )
J U θ θ  or (,)
K K θ θ , firm J earns 
higher (no lower) profits than firm U, given  .  Moreover, if  U VV ≥ J ( ) ,
K U θ θ  is the equilibrium if entry 
occurs, then  ,,,
JJ U U
, K UJ UJ UK U π πππ >>> holds and the profit of firm J is higher than that of  firm U.  The 
first and third inequalities follow from the best response of firm J and firm U respectively, while the 
second inequality is due to the cost advantage of firm J.  
 
However, when firm J enters with its current platform but firm U enters with the newly developed 
localized platform, that is, in the equilibrium ( ) ,
J K θ θ , either firm can earn higher (variable) profits, 
depending on   and  , for  . 
h d h V , hJ U =
 
 15Proposition 3:  Assuming the two firms J and U have identical marginal costs (exclusive of adjustment), 
then there exists a range of R&D costs such that - if entry costs are zero - the less familiar firm, U, earns 
higher profits in an equilibrium of the oligopoly subgame.   
 
Proof:  Assume: .  From prior discussions, we know firm U’s profits can be higher only in the 
equilibrium (
JU cc == c
) ,
J K θ θ .  Define   such that  ˆ V ,, :
JU
J KJ K ππ =    ( )( ) ˆ /3 2 2
J J Vb d ac b d φ ≡− −
)
  Thus, if 
 and if  ( ˆ
JU VVV ≤< ,
J K θ θ  is the equilibrium, then firm U earns higher profits.  Further, the 
equilibrium () ,
J K θ θ  occurs only when  1 U VV ≤  and  4 J VV ≤ .  Thus, for  ( ) 41 ˆ, JU VVV M i n V V ≤≤≤ - 
which is a non-degenerate interval - firm U will earn higher profits.
9     QED 
 
Of course, under the conditions of Proposition 3 it is possible there are two equilibria of the subgame:  
( , )
J K θ θ , which the proposition focuses on, and ( ) ,
KU θ θ .  However: 
 
Corollary 3.1:  Suppose R&D costs are such that:   ( ) 42 ˆ, JU VVV M i n V V <≤< , which is a non-
degenerate interval.  Then, if entry costs for both firms are sufficiently small (or zero), the unique Nash 
equilibrium is () ,
J K θ θ  and the less similar firm earns higher profits.   
 
Consider next the role of entry costs.  As is apparent, for sufficiently low entry costs, both firms will enter.  
If the equilibrium of the duopoly game is anything other than ( ) ,
J K θ θ  then the preceding argument 
shows that the more similar firm must earn higher profits.  However, if the equilibrium of the duopoly 
                                                           
() 21 , U V ∈
9 If   and VV  there are, of course, two Nash equilibrium; however, for   
there is a unique Nash equilibrium if entry costs are zero.   
() 43 , J VV V ∈ 42 JU VVVV <≤<
 16game is ( , )
J K θ θ  then, even if the more similar firm has lower entry costs ( ) J U EE < , it is possible that 
firm U earns higher profits.  It follows from Corollary 3.1 that if   
, then firm U will earn higher profits if both firms enter. 
() 42 ˆ ,, JU VVV M i n V E V ≤≤≤ − ∆
( UJ EEE ∆≡ − )
 
Proposition 3 suggests the following possibility.  When the fixed R&D costs are not “too high”, firm U’s 











<− − ⎜ ⎢ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠




, given entry.  This decision by firm U lowers firm J’s profits and, more 
importantly, lowers the return to J from developing the new platform.  Hence, if J enters the host country, 
it will do so with its home variety.  But, given the fixed entry costs, it is possible that the host market is 
not large enough to support both firms profitably.  In that case, despite the cost advantage firm J enjoys 
due to its similarity with the host market, the unique equilibrium of the game may be one in which only 
the dissimilar firm enters:  
 
Corollary 3.2:  Suppose the conditions of Corollary 3.1 hold:  .  Further, 
suppose entery costs are such that:  
( 42 ˆ, JU VVV M i n V V <≤<
,
J
J KJUJ EE K π π <<< .  Then the unique Nash subgame perfect 
equilibrium is for firm U (the dissimilar firm) to enter as a monopolist. 
 
Proof:  The assumptions of corollary 3.1 guarantee that if, in equilibrium, both firms enter, the equilibrium 
must be () ,
J K θ θ .  The additional assumptions on entry costs imply that, in this outcome, firm J has 
negative profits, whereas firm U has positive profits.  Moreover, the earlier assumption guarantees that if 
firm U does not enter, then firm J’s optimal choice will be to use its home platform ( )
J θ , whereas if firm 
 17U is the only one to enter, it will (still) adopt the local platform ( )
K θ .  Hence, the unique equilibrium of 
the game, for this range of entry costs, is for U to enter with platform ( )
K θ  and for J to stay out.  QED 
 
Thus, we have the rather surprising result that “cultural similarity” may be a strategic liability for the firm. 
 
 
The role of the size of the host market 
 
It is apparent that increases (decreases) in market size have the same effect as proportional decreases 
(increases) in R&D costs and entry costs for both firms.  More specifically, assume  J U EE =  and 
.  Given entry, the equilibrium of the game lies on the 45 degree line in figure 1.  As the 
market size 
JU VVV ==
K N  in the host country increases, φ  decreases and the critical values   increase, 
.  Ignoring entry costs, then, the equilibrium would move along the 45 degree line towards the 
origin as 
i V
1, 2,3, 4 i =
K N  increased.  Thus, for small economies, neither firm would find it profitable to adopt the 
local platform; as country size increased, the more dissimilar firm would first adopt the local variety and 
could earn higher profits.  Further increases in country size lead to multiple equilibria, then back to the 
case in which only the dissimilar firm adopts the local platform, and finally to the case where adopting the 
local platform is a dominant strategy for both firms. 
 
Once entry costs are considered, a richer variety of equilibria emerge
10.  For the smallest countries, neither 
multinational will find it profitable to enter, while for the largest countries both multinationals enter with 
the local platform.  For intermediate sizes, a variety of outcomes is possible.  Starting from the smallest 
                                                           
10 We have explored the impact of country size for a number of numerical specifications.  The one described in the 
paragraph corresponds to one of these specifications.   
 18country, as country size increases we expect that first the similar multinational enters, with its home 
variety.  Further increases could lead to a situation where there are two Nash equilibrium – the one just 
described or another where only the dissimilar firm enters with the local platform.  As country size 
increases further, the possibility arises – as explored in the text – that the sole Nash equilibrium is one in 
which the dissimilar firm enters with the local platform.  Further increases in country size are likely to 
lead to an equilibrium in which both firms enter – the similar firm with its home platform and the 
dissimilar firm with the local platform.  Finally, for the largest countries both firms enter and develop the 
local platform.    
 
Welfare of the host country 
 
The welfare in the host country is largest when both firms adopt the local variety and lowest, of course, in 
the equilibrium when neither firm enters.  Assuming both firms enter, the welfare in the host country is 
ordered as: 
 
() () ( ) ( ) ,,,
KK JK KU JU WWWW , θ θθ θθ θθ ≥≥≥ θ  
 
where  ( ) ,
ij W θ θ  is host country welfare in the equilibrium ( ) ,
ij θ θ ,  , iJ K =  and  .  , jU K =
 
Consider the symmetric case:  ,  JU ccc == J U EE = , and  J U VV = .  The equilibrium lies on the 45 
degree line in figure 1.  As the fixed cost V increases, the equilibrium moves toward the area I, and the 
welfare in the host country decreases.  Also as 
K N  decreases, the host country loses welfare.  From the 
perspective of the host country, a policy that can reduce the firm’s fixed R&D cost V and can encourage 
the multinational to develop the local variety increases welfare. 
 
 195.  Choice of the Platform Variety 
 
In the previous part of the paper, we assumed the initial platform variety was given.  We relax this 
assumption and endogenize the choice of the platform variety in this section.  As previously, we assume 
there are two firms, U and J.  Each multinational has production facility in its home country and is 
considering entering its home country market for a new good, θ.  Moreover, each multinational also is 
considering entering the market for θ in the host country.  Each multinational has a choice of entering by 
developing two localized varieties or by developing only one platform variety.  In the latter case, the firm 
adjusts the platform variety with the additional marginal adjustment cost to serve both countries. Further, 
the multinational chooses the platform variety to maximize profits.
11  First, consider the case where the 
multinational, U, is a monopolist in both its home country and in the host country
12.  Turning to demand, 
we assume that the multinational faces the following inverse demand for the variety 
i θ  in country j. 
 
() /
jj pa q N λ =−
j j  if 
i θ θ = ;   0i f  
ij
i p θ θ = ≠  
 
where 
j θ  is the preferred variety and   is the market size in country j.  Other assumptions made 
previously still hold in this part of the paper. 
j N
     
If the multinational U enters by developing two localized varieties (
U θ  for the home country U and 
K θ  
for the host country), the joint profits of the firm U in the two countries is: 
 
                                                           
11 Buckley and Casson disussed the similar sequence of the R&D decision of the multinationals in Ch. 2.3 of their 
book (2002). 
12 We will discuss the strategic interaction of two multinationals shortly. 














where   is the fixed R&D cost of the firm U to develop a new platform.  The subscript FL denotes this is 
a 'fully localized' production strategy. Call this strategy the FL strategy. 
U V
     






UP P U P K
SA UU
NN
a c bd a c bd E V πθ
λλ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞





P θ  is the platform variety that firm U develops, and 
, ij i j d θ θ ≡−.  The subscript SA denotes that 
the firm produces one standard platform variety and uses the “adjustment technology” to modify the 
variety to suit the local market.  Call this strategy the SA strategy.  Notice that this production strategy 
reduces the fixed R&D cost V but incurs additional marginal costs.  The profit maximizing choice of the 
platform variety and the joint profits of the firm U, if it uses the SA strategy, are
13: 
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K 13 Obviously, if  , the firm is indifferent as to which of the two platforms it uses.   
U NN =
 21where 
UU K d θ θ =−.  The preferred variety in the larger market is the optimal choice of platform 
variety. 
  
Proposition 4:  Suppose firm U is a monopolist in its home country U and in the host country K.  Then: 
 





K θ  as the platform variety and supplies the home 
country using its adjustment process. 





U θ  as the platform variety and supplies the host 
country using its adjustment process. 
3.  Otherwise, firm U develops two localized varieties, 
U θ  and 
K θ , to serve the two countries. 




i V N bd a c bd
λ
⎡⎤ ≡− ⎣⎦ − . 
     
 Proof: Given the monopoly structure, this follows directly from the specification of the profit function. 
 
If the market size of the host country K is smaller than that of the home country U, then firm U enters the 
markets either by developing two localized varieties or by adjusting the home-preferred variety.  Hence, 
the monopoly model for this case is identical to the one previously analyzed.    
 
Corollary 4.1:  Consider two firms, U and J, with identical cost structures, but assume firm J’s  home 
consumers are more “culturally similar” to those of country K  than are the consumers of country U 
( ) .. ,
UJ ie d d > .  Then, if only one firm can (is permitted to) enter the market: (i)firm U is more likely to 
develop two platforms then is firm J; and (ii)firm J would earn strictly higher profits unless it is optimal 
for both firms to develop two platforms. 
 
 22If there were fixed costs of entering the new product market, then there exist a range of costs for which it 
is unprofitable for firm U, but profitable for firm J, to enter this new market.  The firm from the 
“culturally similar” country has an advantage in this non-strategic setting.   
    
Strategic Interaction 
     
Now we consider the strategic choice of platform variety in the oligopoly situation.  All assumptions made 
in previous sections remain valid here.  Assume that two multinationals consider developing a product and 
entering their home and the host countries. Each multinational is a monopolist in its home country and 
competes against the other firm in host country K.  Both multinational U and J have the strategy set 
() { } ,
iP
i SF L S A θ = , iJ U = ,  , where 
P
i θ  is the platform variety that firm i chooses.  Assume costs are 
such that entry into the home country is profitable for both firms.  Further, since we focus on the choice of 
the platform of multinationals, assume that entry into the host country is also profitable for both firms in 
this section
14.  Given entry of both firms, the game is played in the following sequence: 
 
1.  The two multinationals choose their optimal production strategy 
ii sS ∈ ,  .  , iJ U =
2.  Given the optimal production strategy that was chosen in the first stage, if a multinational i adopts 
()
P
i SA θ  strategy, then firm i chooses the optimal platform variety 
P
i θ . 
3.  Given the prior stage decision, each firm chooses its output. 
 
                                                           
14 In the section for the strategic interaction of two multinationals with a predetermined platform, we discussed the 
issue of a multinational’s entry into the host country.  Given the optimal choice of the platform that will be presented 
in this section, the multinational plays the entry game that was shown in the previous section. 
 23Thus, a multinational chooses the number of platforms to develop in the first stage.  In the second stage, 
the firm develops this (these) platform(s) using the firm’s information on markets and the competitor’s 
strategy.  The idea behind this sequence is that, even if the firms choose the number of platforms and the 
prototype of the platform simultaneously, the platform can be changed during the R&D process, 
responding to the competitor’s strategy or additional market information.  However, irreversible 
investment to construct the production facility to produce multiple platforms can not be changed once the 
investment decision is made.  
 
The inverse demand in country j is assumed to be: 
jj
j p aq φ =−  
where   and  /
jj N φλ =
ih
j j qqq =+ j .  
i
j q  and 
h
j q   are the quantities supplied by firms i and h 
respectively.  From the given sequence of decisions, the two multinationals play a two-stage game.  The 
profit matrix in the first stage game is: 
 
Firm J / firm U  FL  SA 
FL  ( ) ,, ,
JU
FL FL FL FL ππ   ( ) ,, ,
JU
FL SA FL SA ππ  
SA  () ,, ,
JU
SA FL SA FL ππ   ( ) ,, ,
JU
SA SA SA SA ππ  
 
where the superscript on profits refers to the multinational, and the subscript refers to the strategies of firm 
J and firm U, resepctively.  If either firm chooses the SA strategy, two firms play the subgame to choose 
platforms in the second stage.  Therefore, except for the equilibrium (FL, FL), the profits of the two 
multinationals are a function of the platforms that are chosen in the next stage. 
 
 24Suppose both multinationals enter the markets by developing two localized varieties (the FL strategy).  
The joint profit of multinational i,   is , iJ U =
15: 
 






FL FL i i j i i i i
NN N N
ac a c c E V ac ac E V π
λλ λ λ
=− + − + − − =− + − − − , jJ U = ;  , ij ≠  
 
If multinational J enters by developing only one platform variety (the SA strategy), but multinational U 
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λλ
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UP P J K
SA FL J UU
NN
ac a c cb d E V πθ
λλ
=− +− + + − −  
 
where 
, PJ j P j
J d θ θ ≡−.  Firm J's optimal choice of platform variety is 
J θ  or 
K θ , depending on the 




, J JU K NN ≥Θ , then 
P
J







SA FL J J
NN
ac ac b d E V πθ
λλ







SA FL U U
NN
ac acb d E V πθ
λλ
=− +− + − −  
If 
, J JU K NN ≤Θ , then 
P
J
K θ θ =  and: 
                                                           
15 We maintain the assumption that marginal costs, without adjustment, are the same for the two firms.   
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,  ,, ij JU = . 
 
Similarly, the optimal platform variety and the joint profits of the two multinationals in (FL, SA) are: 
 
If  , then  
, UU J NN ≥Θ
K U P







FL SA J J
NN
ac acb d E V πθ
λλ
=− +− +− −






FL SA U U
NN
ac ac b d E V πθ
λλ
=− +− − − −  
If  , then 
, UU J NN ≤Θ
K K P







FL SA J J
NN
ac ac E V πθ
λλ
=− +− − −





FL SA U U
NN
acb d ac E V πθ
λλ
=− − +− − −  
 
If (FL, SA) or (SA, FL) is the choice in the first stage, a multinational that adopts the SA strategy plays a 
sub-game to choose its optimal platform in the second stage.  The multinational i chooses the home-
preferred platform 
i θ  as the platform variety if the home market is large enough.  The optimal platform 
variety of multinational i is 
i θ  if  , ij
, ii j K NN ≥Θ ,, JU = , ij ≠ ; otherwise, 
K θ  is the optimal 
platform variety of firm i. 
     
 26Finally, suppose (SA, SA) is chosen in the first stage.  In this case, the two multinationals play a sub-game 
to choose their optimal platform variety.  Profits of  multinational i in (SA, SA) are: 
 
() () () () ()




iP P P i j P i K P j K
SA SA J U ii
NN
a c bd a c bd c bd E V πθ θ
λλ
=− − + − + + + − −  
 
where  ,  , and  .  Due to the convexity of the profit function in marginal cost, the 
profit-maximizing platform variety of firm i is 
, iJ U = , jJ U = i ≠ j
i θ  or 
K θ .  Therefore, assuming entry into the host country 
is profitable for both firms, the profit matrix for the platform variety game in the second stage becomes: 
     
Firm J / firm U 
U θ  
K θ  
J θ   ( ) ( ) () ,, ,, ,
JJ U UJ U
SA SA SA SA πθ θ πθ θ   ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, ,, ,
JJ K UJ K
SA SA SA SA πθ θ πθ θ  
K θ   ()( ) () ,, ,, ,
JK U UK U
SA SA SA SA πθ θ πθ θ   ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, ,, ,
JK K UK K
SA SA SA SA πθ θ πθ θ
 
The profits of the firms in each equilibrium are shown in table 6. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Given the profit structure, the firm's choice of platform variety depends on the market size of the home 
country, and we obtain the following relations: 
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Notice that   and   because   1 NN ≥ 2 4 3 NN ≥ () () ( ) ( ) 12 16 9 / 2 0
JK U NN b d N a cb d − =⋅ − −≥  and 
() () ( () 34 16 9 / 2 0




.  Also, given  , then   and 
.  Whenever  , the choice of 
U dd > 3 NN >
4 NN > 2
U NN ≤
K θ  is a dominant strategy (in this sub-game) for 
multinational U.  Whenever  ,  1
U NN ≥
U θ  is U’s dominant strategy.  For   , either  ( 21 ,
U NN N ∈ )
U θ  or 
K θ  can be the platform variety chosen by firm U, depending on (its beliefs concerning) firm J's choice of 
platform variety.  The strategic decision of firm J is similar.  Figure 2 shows the pattern of the equilibrium 
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 28Figure 2. Equilibrium states of the sub-game  ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ,
PP
JU SA SA θθ  in () ,
J U NN  space 
 
Notice that  24
K NNN << but the comparison of   and   to  1 N 3 N
K N  is ambiguous
16.   
 
If both home countries’ markets are considerably larger than the host country, the equilibrium of the sub-
game to choose the optimal platforms is I: ( ) ,
JU θ θ .  If the market size in the two home countries are 
similar to each other and “comparable” in size to the host country, the equilibrium of the sub-game is D 
and multiple equilibria exist: () ,
J K θ θ  and ( ) ,
K U θ θ .  If the markets of the two home countries are both 
considerably smaller than that of the host country, the equilibrium is in area A where both multinationals 
choose 
K θ  as their platform variety.  If one home country’s market i is considerably larger than that of the 
host country, then a decrease in size of the other home market will lead to an equilibrium in which the 
multinational from the small home market chooses 
K θ  as its optimal platform variety, while the other 
multinational chooses its home variety as its platform.
17
     
Now return to the production method game in the first stage.  Assuming the two home countries have 
considerably larger markets than the host country, the profit matrix becomes: 
  
 
        
                                                           
16 We know  131 .
K N NN N <<  if  ( ) ( ) { } 22 7 1 2
JU J ac b d bd d 0 . − −+ − >   The first term must be positive; 
thus, if   is sufficiently larger than 
U d
J d ,  1
K N N < .   
17 Clearly, similar results would hold if each firm faced a competitor in its home market.   
 29Firm J / firm U  FL  ()
U SA θ  
FL  ( ) ,, ,
JU
FL FL FL FL ππ   ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, ,
JU UU
FL SA FL SA πθ πθ  
( )
J SA θ   ( ) ( ) () ,, ,
JJ UJ
SA FL SA FL πθ πθ   ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, ,, ,
JJ U UJ U
SA SA SA SA πθ θ πθ θ  
 
The duopoly game with the endogenous choice of platform variety here is the same as that in the second 
section in which the initial platform of each multinational was taken as given.  If the multinationals come 
from larger home markets than that of the host country, they will enter the host country by either adjusting 
the home variety or developing a (second) local platform.  As seen in that section, the multinational from 
the “less similar” country may have a strategic advantage, since the (same) expenditure on the fixed cost 
(R&D) yields a larger return for that firm than for the multinational that comes from a “similar” country.   
 
Proposition 3’:  Assume   and  . Assuming the two firms J and U have identical 
marginal costs (exclusive of adjustment), then there exists a range of R&D costs such that - if entry costs 
are zero - the less familiar firm, U, earns higher profits in an equilibrium of the oligopoly subgame.    
1
U NN ≥ 3
J NN ≥
 
Corollary 3.1’: Assume   and  .  Suppose R&D costs are such that:  
, which is a non-degenerate interval.  Then, if entry costs for both firms are 
sufficiently small (or zero), the unique Nash equilibrium is 
1
U NN ≥ 3
J NN ≥
( 4 ˆ, JU VVV M i n V V <≤< ) 2
( ) ,
J K θ θ  and the less similar firm earns 
higher profits. 
 
 30Corollary 3.2’: Assume   and  .  Suppose the conditions of Corollary 3.1 hold: 
.  Further, suppose entery costs are such that:  
1
U NN ≥ 3
J NN ≥
( 4 ˆ, JU VVV M i n V V <≤< ) 2 ,,
JU
J KJUJ EE K π π <<< .  Then 
the unique Nash subgame perfect equilibrium is for firm U (the dissimilar firm) to enter as a monopolist. 
 
Finally, it is apparent from this section that, much as cultural dissimilarity may be a strategic advantage, so 
may a small home market.   
 
Proposition 5:  Consider a new product market where each of two multinationals has a monopoly in its 
home market, but can compete against each other in a host country, K.  If the two home markets are 
culturally similar, the multinational from the smaller country will adopt 
K θ  as its platform, and hence will 
have a strategic advantage in country K.  It will earn higher profits in K, and – in equilibrium – may be the 
only firm to enter K. 
 
The logic behind this proposition is identical to the preceding logic.  The proposition brings to mind the 
abundance of multinationals from smaller countries, such as Switzerland.     
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The advantage (disadvantage) of a multinational due to cultural similarity (dissimilarity) between the 
home and the host country is widely perceived.  However, this area is generally neglected in the study of 
the multinational.  This paper develops a model to study the strategic interaction of multinationals that 
have different cultural backgrounds.  It is commonly argued that a multinational from one country that has 
more similar cultural background to the host country is considered to have a cost or revenue advantage 
over other multinationals.  However, this paper shows that in a strategic equilibrium of two multinationals, 
this cultural similarity may turn out to be a strategic disadvantage. 
 31 
We used a production strategy that allows firms to develop a platform and adjust it to satisfy different 
consumers: for example, a firm could develop a common frame of a car (platform) and install different 
options to produce different models (Muffatto, 1999).  This production strategy is widely observed in 
reality, but is not widely used in previous studies of firms.  Furthermore, this production strategy seems to 
be a common production strategy among multinationals (Kang, Park, Lee, and Byun, 2002; Kang, Park, 
Lee, and Byun, 2003; Kang, Lee, Lee, and Ahn, 2004).  In our model this strategy may be considered one 
of standardizing a product to allow the firm to reduce R&Ds cost by developing fewer varieties to serve 
different tastes in different countries.  However, adjusting the developed platform(s) increases marginal 
cost.  An alternative production strategy in our model is a localization strategy, where the firm develops a 
new fully localized variety to satisfy a specific preference in the host country.  This localization strategy 
reduces marginal cost but incurs higher R&D cost. 
 
Assuming countries that are “culturally similar” have similar tastes for a product, our analysis shows the 
following.  First, if the local market can only support one firm, auctioning off the right to enter the local 
market to the highest bidder may not be optimal from the perspective of the host country.  Since a 
multinational from a “culturally similar” country has the cost advantage, on the existing variety, over other 
multinationals, it can bid higher and win the host market.  However, this multinational won’t find it 
privately optimal to adopt the localization production strategy and thus consumers will pay higher prices. 
With strategic interaction between two multinationals, assuming the home markets of the multinationals 
are considerably larger than the host market, it is possible that a multinational from the country that is not 
culturally similar to the host country could earn a higher profit than the other multinational.  Further, in 
equilibrium, the fact this multinational will adopt the local platform may effectively block entry of the 
multinational from the culturally similar country.  Thus, sometimes what seems a blessing may be a curse. 
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Table 1. Foreign Affiliates of US-based MNE  in the high income countries



















Australia 28,290  19,890  41.08 (5)  
f 3068.28 (5)  171.64 (6) 
Belgium  28,930  10,348  53.54 (3)  4990.82 (4)  570.83 (2) 
Canada  29,740  31,630  60.92 (2)  10649.07 (1)  456.21 (3) 
France  27,460  59,725  20.88 (6)  2108.48 (7)  58.05 (8) 
Germany  27,460  82,551  17.18 (7)  2491.95 (6)  47.40 (10) 
Italy  26,760  57,646  12.73 (10)  1247.87 (8)  37.70 (12) 
Japan  28,620  127,210  5.63 (12)  1180.58 (10)  55.44 (9) 
Korea, Republic of  17,930  47,912  4.59 (13)  386.31 (13)  27.80 (13) 
Netherlands  28,600  16,215  79.19 (1)  6978.17 (2)  1164.60 (1) 
Portugal  17,980  10,121  14.52 (8)  689.36 (12)  179.33 (5) 
Spain  22,020  41,101  13.48 (9)  1191.92 (9)  91.09 (7) 
Taiwan  
e 23,400  22,894  10.00 (11)  1025.68 (11)  46.78 (11) 
United Kingdom  27,650  59,280  45.56 (4)  6269.32 (3)  229.25 (4) 
 
a.  majority-owned foreign affiliates: the combined ownership of all U.S. parents exceeds 50 percent. 
b.  The classification of the high income countries follows the classification of the World Bank  
c.  World Bank (2003) 
d.  Number of affiliates, Sales, and Net income of US-based MNEs: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2002) 
 33e.  Data for Taiwan: Estimated 2003 GDP per capita and estimated 2005 population, The World 
Factbook (CIA) 
f.  Numbers in brackets denote the ranking. 
 
 




Standardized and locally 







b  2002 2004  2002  2004 
Motor vehicles and 
equipment 
10  15.6 60  46.9 30  37.5 
Electronics 20  25  56 51.8  24  23.2 
Machinery and 
Equipment 
13 5.9  60.9  82.4 26.1  11.8 
Precision  Instrument  13.3  30.8 73.3  46.2 13.3  23.1 
Textiles, Apparel, and 
leather products 
28.6 21.4  50  42.9  21.4 35.7 
Chemical 44.4  19.4  50 64.5  5.6  16.1 
Overall 22.9  19.7  56.1  54.9  21  25.4 
 
a.  “Foreign Direct Investment by Korea-based Manufacturing Firms 2002”, D. Y. Kang, C. K. Park, 
W. B. Lee, C. W. Byun, KIET Issue Paper 2002-114, 2002 
b.  “Foreign Direct Investment by Korea-based Manufacturing Firms 2004”, D. Y. Kang, S. Y. Lee, 
W. B. Lee, S. H. Ahn, KIET Issue Paper 2004-162, 2004 
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Table 3. The property of products in Korea produced by Foreign-based multinationals 
 









Foreign-based MNE in 
Korea 
8 25  67 
 
a.  “Foreign Direct Investment in Korean Manufacturing Industry 2003”, D. Y. Kang, C. K. Park, W. 
B. Lee, C. W. Byun, KIET Issue Paper 2003-140, 2003 
 
 
Table 4. Summary of conditions in the Monopoly case 
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 35Table 5. Duopoly profits of firms J and U in the host country, exclusive of entry costs 
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a.  From the structure of profits, the following hold for all parameters: 
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xU xK π π >  and  ,
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No matter which strategy firm h plays, it earns higher profits when the other firm uses its original 
platform rather than the localized platform. 
 
 
 36Table 6. Duopoly profits of the firms J and U in the home and the host countries when both firms adopt 
the SA strategy 
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